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Abstract—This article examines Chinese reverse mergers 
(RMs), historically a popular method for Chinese companies to 
enter the United States capital markets.  The authors develop a 
regression model to identify the characteristics associated with 
successful Chinese RM companies and compare their long term 
performance to other benchmarks, to include U.S. reverse 
mergers, Chinese cross-listed firms and the Russell 2000.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A “reverse merger”, often termed a "reverse takeover", allows 
a private firm to acquire a publicly traded firm to obtain their 
exchange listing. For all practical purposes, the process is an 
acquisition where the target firm's management seeks a public 
entity with which to merge and arranges for the public acquirer to 
make a bid in exchange of some combination of cash and/or 
stock.  The United States experienced more reverse mergers 
(RMs) than initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2002 through 
2010 [1].  RMs have been a common way for a foreign firms to 
go public.  In fact, over 40 percent of RMs in the U.S. from 2008 
to 2010 were conducted by foreign companies as a means of 
entering the U.S. capital market, as compared to approximately 9 
percent of all cross listings and 6 percent of all IPOs during the 
same period.  Most of these RMs involved Chinese companies 
[2].  There has been relatively little academic research on these 
Chinese RM companies.  This study is motivated by the need to 
gain more insight into this topic. 
In an RM, a company will buy a publicly-listed company 
to gain access to a capital market, most often motivated to 
gain credibility and quick infusions of capital [3].  The 
literature identifies many other RM advantages, to include: 1) 
the speed to complete, which is normally under six months 
compared to IPOs which can years [4], 2) significantly less 
cost, avoiding most underwriter and investment bank fees [4], 
[5], and 3) the RM process avoids much of the SEC scrutiny 
compared to alternatives [6].  
RMs have experienced popularity but have also faced 
criticism over the last 20 years. Many mergers have been 
consummated successfully, legitimately, and with maximum 
transparency. From 2010 to 2012, dozens of RMs faced fraud 
accusations (many of these were ultimately dismissed). As a 
result of these problems, in 2011 the SEC issued an Investor 
Bulletin highlighting the risks of investing in reverse merger 
companies and passed “seasoning” rsules making it harder for 
reverse mergers to migrate to more prominent national exchanges 
[7]. 
Academic literature and media coverage highlight the 
fraudulent accounting practices that led to approximately 47 
Chinese reverse merger firms to be delisted from 2010 through 
2012 (e.g. Lee, Li, and Zhang, 2015; Jindra, Voetmann and 
Torben, 2014) [8], [9]. The result was the loss of approximately 
72% market capitalization of U.S. listed Chinese companies 
between 2011 and 2012 [10].   
These investigations bring investors to question the adjusted 
risk return related to investing in these Chinese firms and 
motivate this study. Specifically, we attempt to determine the 
financial characteristics of successful Chinese RMs and evaluate 
their long term financial performance compared to other 
benchmarks through 2014.  Understanding these characteristics is 
helpful both to investors and to other companies which are 
considering RMs.  Examining this topic is important, as RMs 
have resurfaced once again as an appropriate alternative for 
companies which do not qualify for a traditional IPOs or which 
prefer to avoid the additional expense, risk and extended 
timeframes associated with IPOs [11]. 
II. METHOD 
A. Data sources 
Many reverse mergers trade on pink sheets or the Over the 
Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and are not identified or 
tracked by popular data sites such as CRSP and COMPUSTAT. 
As such, we obtain most detailed RM data from DealFlow Media 
and their subsidiary, PrivateRaise’s (DFPR) subscription 
database. This firm has tracked RM participant's characteristics, 
private investment in public equity (PIPE) related data (if 
applicable) and basic transaction information since January 2004. 
The total Chinese RM sample represents 468 transactions that 
took place from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2011.  
DFPR has tracked RMs in significantly more detail since 2008, 
resulting in a 238 Chinese RM subsample and a 462 U.S. RM 
sample which represent all the Chinese and U.S. RM transactions 
in the three year period January 1, 2008 through December 31, 
2011 [2]. 
DFPR does not track daily stock transactions or ongoing 
financial statement data.  We obtain daily stock transaction data 
from Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance through 2014.  Financial 
statement information is hand collected from SEC filed 8-K/As, 
8-Ks, 10Ks, SC-14F1s, Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. From 
Charles W. DuVal and Will Quilliam 
DOI: 10.5176/2010-4804_4.1.361 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.4 No.1, July 2015
©The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
114
these filings we collect key accounting variables for these 
Chinese RM firms for two years before they consummate their 
RM, and for every year thereafter through 2011 or their delisting, 
whichever occurs first.  The accounting variables include total 
assets, revenue, net income, cash and equivalents, debt, operating 
cash flow, beta, numbers of outstanding shares, shareholder stock 
options and percentage of stock held by insiders and institutions 
[2]. 
Sjostrom (2008), Floros and Shastri (2009) and Floros and 
Sapp (2011) note that RMs should not be compared to traditional 
IPOs for reasons that include their smaller size and information 
asymmetry [12], [13], [6]. We compare these Chinese RM 
companies’ characteristics and performances to three 
benchmarks. First, the Halter USX CHINA Index comprised of 
198 Chinese firms that include 75 Chinese RMs.  We use the 
financial data for the remaining 123 cross-listed Chinese firms to 
create one benchmark for financial characteristics and 
performance comparisons. Second, to analyze any unique 
Chinese motivations for RMs, we also compare their 
characteristics and performance to the 440 RMs consummated 
between two U.S. firms that took place during the same time 
period. Third, we compare Chinese RM performance to the 
Russell 2000. 
B. Regression analysis 
To determine the Chinese RM firm characteristics that drive 
performance, Table 1 reports regression results for the impact of 
firm specific variables on the returns (𝑅𝑖𝑡) of Chinese RMs that 
have not been delisted and survive one year during the sample 
period of January 1, 2004, through  December 31, 2011.  
Specifically, the following model is estimated:     
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐼𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
We use the log of total assets (SIZE) as a proxy for firm 
size, cash and equivalents (CASH) to total assets to control for 
liquidity constraints, and both return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) for profitability. Previous studies have 
found conflicting results with regard to whether returns are 
influenced by the RM participants being from different 
industries (IND) and the use of PIPE (PIPE) financing. 
Therefore, we use dummy variables for these as well as for 
equity-based compensation (EQUITY) to investigate whether 
these variables influence Chinese RM firms' performance over 
time. Interviews with RM industry experts report the ability to 
offer equity-based compensation, once illegal in China, has 
influenced Chinese firms' motivations to expand to the U.S. 
market through an RM.  Industry experts include (1) the 
principle partner in each of the top three law practices (as 
rated by numbers of RM transactions representing Chinese 
RMs entering the U.S. [2]) that cater to Chinese RM 
participants and (2) key personnel at PrivateRaise who assist 
Chinese firms to find U.S. merger partipants. 
III. RESULTS 
Table 1 presents three models, one for each dummy 
interaction variable. Overall, results indicate larger, more liquid 
firms experience higher returns, as the coefficients for log of total 
assets (SIZE) and CASH are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Interestingly, proxies for profitability (ROA and ROE) do 
not have a statistically significant impact on returns the first year. 
Like Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) [5], this study finds 
participants from the same industry are not significantly different 
with respect to long-run returns. 
Table 1 further reports firms that offer equity-based 
compensation experience significantly higher first year returns at 
the 1% level. This result appears to support the industry 
professional reports that equity-based compensation plays a role 
in Chinese RMs. In addition, those firms using PIPES realize a 
positive and significant increase in returns. Sjostrom (2008) 
argues access to PIPE financing (typically supplied by hedge 
funds) is the primary reason firms choose RMs as the vehicle by 
which to go public, as they have no other alternatives for funding 
[12]. Overall, the three models have adjusted R-squares that range 
from 14.55% to 23.17% and F-statistics show all the models are 
significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2 compares the entire sample of Chinese RMs (that 
were not delisted) long term financial performance to other 
benchmarks, specifically the cross-listed Chinese firms that 
comprise the Halter USX CHINA index and the Russell 2000 
from 2008 through 2014. After the extensive negative publicity 
and in light of the perceived risk versus return, Chinese RMs 
yield a higher average return than all the other benchmarks over 
this seven year period.  A calculation of cumulative returns over 
this period yields the same result, with Chinese RMs returns 
(82.52%) far exceeding this sample of Chinese cross-listed firms 
(-49.06).  
Table 1 Impact of Chinese reverse merger firm characteristics on firm 
performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.0043 (2.39)*** 0.0046 (2.48)*** 0.0042 
(2.75)*** 
SIZE 0.0054 (2.88)*** 0.0061 (2.63)*** 0.0064 
(2.78)*** 
CASH 0.0071 (2.91)*** 0.0068 (2.89)*** 0.0065 
(2.89)*** 
ROA 0.0008 (0.87) 0.0007 (0.86) 0.0005 
(0.85) 
ROE 0.0006 (0.95) 0.0007 (0.99) 0.0006 
(0.97) 
IND 0.0003 (0.10)   
EQUITY  0.0041 (2.73)***  
PIPE   0.0074 
(3.21)*** 
R2 0.1455 0.1592 0.2317 
F-statistic 2.59*** 2.71*** 2.82*** 
# 
observations 
238 238 238 
Table 2 A comparison of Chinese reverse merger financial performance 
to benchmarks 2008-2014 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russell 
2000 













8.54 35.43 21.54 18.43 -23.56 -21.74 45.22 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
There has been limited study focused on the foreign 
companies that come to the U.S. through a RM. Since 2011, 
academics and the media have highlighted fraudulent 
accounting practices that led to substantial loss of market 
capitalization in Chinese firms [14]. However, as of May 
2015, almost the entire 2011 – 2012 loss of capitalization has 
been recaptured [12]. Like all cycles in financial markets, 
RMs are once again becoming more popular alternatives for 
companies which are not a good match for an IPO or want to 
avoid the related additional time, investment and risk. As 
investors seek higher yields, this study attempts to fill a 
research gap as it examines the motivations and financial 
characteristics that drive performance of Chinese RMs, which 
have accounted for over 63% of RMs into the U.S. since 2008. 
Results show Chinese firms that engage in RMs are 
motivated by the ability to offer equity-based compensation 
and overall, those that do are more successful.  The data shows 
88% of Chinese RMs have a form of equity-based 
compensation versus 67% of U.S. RMs. Overall, the evidence 
also supports the argument that Chinese RMs seek quick 
infusions of capital through PIPES. Contrary to many other 
findings in the literature, the evidence shows Chinese RMs 
that use PIPES experience higher returns. 
In addition, from 2008 to 2014, Chinese RMs experienced 
significantly higher long-term average and cumulative returns 
when compared to benchmarks that include cross-listed 
Chinese firms that comprise the Halter USX CHINA Index, 
the Russell 2000 and U.S. RMs. These results appear to 
support Lee, Li, and Zhang’s (2013) argument that Chinese 
RMs (including those accused of accounting fraud) are more 
profitable with better cash flows and higher longevity over 
their first three years than matched RMs [8]. In summary, 
although RMs seem to involve considerable risk, both Chinese 
and U.S. RMs generate positive long-term performance for 
shareholders of the new entity as compared to the Chinese 
cross-listed sample. 
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